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Abstract. This paper traces the evolving ideas of an approach to “open
systems” that interact with the physical world. Such systems nowadays
almost always include computers. The design in the simplest cases has
a control computer connected to sensors that receive information about
the physical world and to actuators that can cause some aspects of that
world to change. Jackson’s “Problem Frame Approach” is to think about
the computer system with respect to the requirement of the desired over-
all system behaviour; the “Hayes/Jackson/Jones” (HJJ) approach intro-
duces sufficient formalism to support the derivation of the specification
of the computer control system.
1 Introduction
This paper is an update of on-going research that Ian Hayes and I have the
pleasure of undertaking with Michael Jackson. After the initial letter of each
of our family names, the research will be referred to as the “HJJ” approach
(citations below). The HJJ ideas owe a huge debt to Michael’s “Problem Frame
Approach” (PFA) [Jac03] (and PFDs [Jac00] in general). This section sets out
the background; Section 2 outlines those parts of the HJJ approach with which
we are moderatly satisfied; the problem areas are sketched in Section 3; and our
current ideas on filling the gaps are mentioned in Section 4.
The three authors of [HJJ03,JHJ07] share the –not uncommon– view that
the process of software development is imperfect. That having been said, it is
also our view that the theory for development of “closed” systems is known. By
a closed system, we mean one that exists in some neat domain such as number
theory or matrix algebra. Here one can write a brief and complete specifica-
tion of what it means, say, to print all of the primes less than a million or to
invert a matrix. Furthermore, ideas like data reification1 and operation decom-
position [Jon90] can be employed to show that steps of design lead from such a
specification to code that satisfies the specification. (If this were to be a complete
1 I owe thanks to Michael for pointing out that the transition from a clean mathe-
matical abstraction such as sets to a machine implementation based (necessarily) on
a mess of pointers should not be considered to be “refinement”. Sadly, few others
have seen the force of the observation and adopted my use of “reify” as a more
appropriate verb.
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account, we should add comments about compositionality, assumptions and ac-
knowledge that real development projects undergo requirements changes during
development.)
The situation is rather different with “open systems” where it is the physical
world that both sets the context for the system and –in some sense– provides
the touchstone of acceptability of the system. A classic example that we have
(over) used is that of a “sluice gate”.2 The overall requirement might be that the
ratio of open to closed time of the physical gate approximates to some required
ratio. A more challenging example might be an advisory system for air traffic
controllers whose ultimate responsibility is to achieve minimum vertical and
horizontal separation of physical aircraft.
Such open systems are the meat of Michael’s Problem Frame Approach
(PFA) [Jac03,Jac00]. The insistence in PFA in grounding the requirements of
a system in the physical world is central to HJJ.
At most of the points on the complexity spectrum from sluice gates to air
traffic control systems, the physical phenomena are likely to vary continuously.
Various notations have been used for such descriptions. Perhaps the best known
is the “Duration Calculus” [CHR91,CH04]. HJJ has deployed the notation pro-
posed by Ian Hayes and Brendan Mahony [MH91,MH92] (which references also
begin to use the ideas in the next paragraph). Key to the usefulness of such
notations for continuous variables is the ability to use a form of integration that
makes it possible to express things like the amount of time, perhaps over a stated
interval, that a value has certain properties.
My own contribution to HJJ derives from earlier work on the development
of concurrent programs: [Jon81,Jon83a,Jon83b] show that it is possible to use
rely and guarantee conditions to achieve compositional development even in
the presence of “interference”. The specific rules offered in these early papers
are not the point. More recently, what might be called “rely/guarantee think-
ing” [Jon96,CJ00,CJ07,JP08] generalises the approach to the rather obvious po-
sition that if one wants to reason compositionally about interfering systems,
one must record something about the interference. We have used rely/guarantee
thinking in HJJ to record assumptions about those physical components that
are part of the overall system but are not included in the software system that
is to be designed.
That’s enough background, it is time to outline the HJJ approach in as far
as we are confident about its features.
2 For readers unfamiliar with [Jac00] (or the HJJ papers themselves) a few words
about this example should suffice. Consider an irrigation channel into which the flow
of water is controlled by a sluice gate. This gate has sensors at the extreme positions.
There is also a bi-directional motor that will raise or lower the gate. As well as being
connected to the gate, the motor has actuators which can set its direction and turn
it on or off. The sensors and actuators are connected to a control computer which
can thus (indirectly) cause the gate to move safely between extreme positions.
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2 What we (think we) know
For open systems, a major issue is how a specification is obtained. Think of a
requirement to maintain the temperature in some space within certain bounds.
Software alone can have no affect on the temperature of anything but this does
not mean that one should immediately begin writing the specification of a con-
trol system as an isolated component. It is basic to PFA to ground the system
in its overall physical environment. In HJJ as well, we begin by writing the re-
quirement of the overall system at the level of the physical phenomena: that is,
the temperature of the room. If one forgets what one knows about a particular
geographic location, it is obvious that it is necessary to make assumptions about
how fast the contextual (ambient) temperature can change. So, from the outset,
one is faced with recording some assumptions. To arrive at the specification of
what Michael calls “the silicon package” (i.e. the control system), it is necessary
to record more assumptions.
It is the essence of the HJJ approach to “derive” the specification of the
silicon package from that of the overall system. Two of the contributors to HJJ
are unreformed formalists so they strive for notations with which all of the
specifications and assumptions can be made precise (and tractable) enough that
proofs can be written. The extra assumptions that are required to make such
a derivation possible are about both the way in which the software can obtain
values of things in the physical world and how sending signals might cause other
(physical) components to affect the real world. In fact, the assumptions often
twine together the outputs and inputs. In the case of a temperature control
system, one needs assumptions about sensors that convert the temperature of
the physical environment into signals that can be read by the computer on which
the software is executed and assumptions about the effect (on the temperature
of the room) of sending signals via actuators to heating and/or cooling devices.
The HJJ approach then is to begin with a requirement grounded in the phys-
ical world; to record assumptions about how the world can change; to record
further assumptions about physical components of the system; to “derive” the
specification of the control system (silicon package); and to check that an imple-
mentation of the silicon package that fulfils its specification, in an environment
that satisfies the assumptions, will indeed keep the overall system within the
bounds required in the physical context. (The reader might well wonder what
happens if these assumptions are undermined by failure of some physical com-
ponent; this question is addressed below.)
In nearly all of the systems we have tackled with the HJJ approach, this
reasoning ends up being about continuously varying quantities. For example, in
the sluice gate problem in [JHJ07], the physical phenomena are indexed by con-
tinuous time. Many providers of formal methods tend to what might be termed
“premature discretisation”; because their method revolves around discrete oper-
ations (or events), they assume some arbitrary polling frequency to reduce the
understanding of the continuous phenomena to discrete behaviour. For people
who will extol for hours the advantages of formal reasoning this is interesting
behaviour. It should be clear that questions like the polling frequency need to be
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reasoned about in terms of assumed rates of change etc. It is almost inevitable
that one ends up at a discrete controller but the derivation of its specification
should be part of the (formal) development process.
It is important to note that we are here “preserving the design history” in
the same sense that standard formal stepwise refinement leaves behind a record
of design steps and their justification.
It is crucial to understand that the HJJ process does not require that the de-
signer build a complete model of the physical components of the system. Again,
in the sluice gate example, assumptions are made about the position sensors re-
turning indicators that the gate has achieved a required physical position within
a certain period of time from sending a polarity setting signal followed by a start
motor signal. This circumvents the need to build a model of motors, gears etc.
So, to return to the issue at the beginning of this section (how to obtain a
specification of a control system that is intended to interact with the physical
world), the basic HJJ approach can be summarised as:
– determine the requirements of the overall system with respect to the physical
phenomena
– record assumptions about the way those phenomena can be affected by things
beyond the system
– record assumptions about the physical components of the system (linking
the external world to the silicon package via sensors and actuators)
– “derive” a specification of the silicon package that will achieve the over-
all requirement if the other system components behave according to their
assumptions
Of course, the overall requirement and the assumptions about other compo-
nents must be agreed with the customer. But it is a key advantage of the HJJ
approach that it leaves a record of assumptions for subsequent deployments. In
contrast to any approach that tries to build a model of the environment, the HJJ
message might be viewed as “how little can we say (about the environment)?”.
Interestingly, we have found many examples where rely conditions are used
within a development to record assumptions that it is necessary to make for safe
use of the physical components of the system. For example, in the sluice gate,
one must not reverse the polarity of the gears connecting the motor to the gate
whilst the motor is running.
Most importantly, the HJJ approach councils against a premature jump into
the specification of the silicon package. Such a jump nearly always results in a
confusion about assumptions and requirements. Examples of formal specifica-
tions in the literature where this is the case are too numerous to list.
This much of the HJJ approach was fairly well established in [HJJ03] and is
most clearly set out [JHJ07]. Both papers use the sluice gate problem which is,
among other reasons, interesting because it also has to address fault-tolerant be-
haviour. At one level, addressing degraded modes of behaviour requires no more
than recording weaker assumptions about the environment but as is conceded
in the next section, there is a difficulty in knowing the best way to combine the
specifications of normal and error recovery modes.
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Before moving on to the issues that still need to be resolved, it is worth
sketching what the HJJ approach might achieve for one or two aspects of a com-
plex system like an advisory system for air traffic controllers. Suppose that a
base air traffic control system is in place: RADAR, displays of aircraft position,
etc. are all established; assume further that one then wished to specify a new sys-
tem that helped Air Traffic Controllers (ATCs) by warning of future approaches
within specified distances and –furthermore– to carry out thought experiments
like “what are the effects of sending an aircraft on a particular vertical angle
and acceleration”. Given the large system that already exists, the obvious temp-
tation is to use the expertise of people who know the existing system and the
physical behaviour of aircraft and to simply specify the new component. The
HJJ approach would advise against this; or rather would suggest that there are
advantages in a more circuitous route to the specification of the new component
(as a separate silicon package).
What the ATCs are required to achieve is physical separation of aircraft.3
This is a sobering place to start: an ATC does not, in fact, move aircraft. Thus
one sees at once that a fairly simple overall requirement is actually made chal-
lenging (to meet) because of the assumptions that have to be made. Interest-
ingly, the assumptions in this case (as in many complex systems) involve some
on human players: it is not an actuator that connects the silicon package to the
position of the aircraft but rather the ATC sending a voice message to a pilot
who might or might not react as intended. Such assumptions must be recorded.
Furthermore, there are many assumptions to be made about the physical
ability of an aircraft to achieve particular changes of position. Factors that in-
fluence this include type, load and air pressure. Focusing on this last item, the
approach of jumping straight to a specification of the new sub-system might
well make inadvertent assumptions about the potential rate of change in air
pressure at a particular geographic location. This in turn might result in reading
air pressure at some fixed intervals.
If, instead, one determines the potential effect of each of the factors on ma-
neuverability of aircraft, one can calculate what might have to be considered
to achieve certain tolerances; one can record assumptions about changes in air
pressure; and prove that a certain currency of information is adequate. Here
again, the recorded assumptions could be invaluable if the same software were
to be deployed in another geographic location.
3 Strictly, there are also progress conditions: the easiest way to achieve separation is
to have few –or no– aircraft in the sky.
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3 What we know that we don’t know
Dubium Sapientiae initium4
How far should one push out the boundaries of a system?
We have argued that the HJJ approach (just as PFA) should start by pushing
out the boundaries of “the system” to be considered — but how far? This is
certainly a valid question about HJJ but it is in some sense unanswerable. To
continue with the imaginary air traffic scenario, if one were to regard the system
as that of the planet, one might indeed decide that safe aircraft separation was
best achieved by flying less planes thus obviating the need for ways to inform
ATCs of ways to handle more flights. It is however an answer that is unlikely to
impress National Air Traffic Services (NATS is the UK body responsible for air
traffic in the UK airspace).
One can see that the approach of recording assumptions comes into play
wherever one places the boundary by returning to the example that our papers
have analysed in more detail:
– Setting the boundary at moving the sluice gate prompts the need for as-
sumptions about the relationship between request signals (presumably caus-
ing actuators and motors to perform) and return signals from sensors with
further assumptions about the relationship between the sensor values and
phenomena in the physical world.
– The sluice gate was proposed by Michael as an object of study in [Jac00] as a
way of controlling the irrigation of fields — were one to view the requirements
at that level, assumptions would be needed about the presence of water at
the gate.
– Presumably the real reason for releasing the irrigation stream is to achieve
a certain moisture level in the soil — one could only achieve a satisfiable
specification at this boundary by making assumptions about the weather.
– One can go yet further and discuss things like farm subsidies if the require-
ment is about farm profits.
With typical pragmatism, Michael offers the only insight possible as to where
one should stop this broadening: if the customer is the farmer –and he says “the
job is to achieve a certain gate open/close ratio”– then that bounds the concern
of the developer. It is however true that one can sometimes get a clearer view
by considering a slight extension that grounds the purpose without undermining
the legitimate requests of the paying customer. For example, knowing that the
gate is for irrigation might prompt a wise designer to make the actual ratio of
open vs. closed times a rather easy parameter to change in the created system.
There are also overriding ethical considerations that would, hopefully, prevent
most designers building systems whose function was manifestly immoral.
4 As a classics scholar like Michael can tell you, Descartes was somewhat ahead of
Donald Rumsfeld (or even Thoreau “To know that we know what we know, and
that we do not know what we do not know, that is true knowledge”) in pointing out
that “Doubt is the origin of wisdom”.
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Linking fault tolerant specifications to the idealised behaviour
A technical challenge that has occupied the three authors for some time is han-
dling the sort of exceptional behaviour that is often seen in fault tolerant sys-
tems. For any system there is in our opinion a strong case for recording first its
idealised behaviour. The term “idealised” is meant to cover the obvious function-
ality which is only likely to be achievable under optimistic assumptions such as
all of the physical components working without failure. The issue that in a sense
represents the difference between the two HJJ papers ([HJJ03] and [JHJ07]) is
how one tackles adjoining the specification of the exceptional behaviour to that
of the idealised system. Unfortunately, we do not feel that the ideas in the more
recent paper are a total solution — see Section 4.
To return to the sluice gate example, suppose the assumption that turning
the motor on should achieve a physical change in the gate position appears to
be false: after a sensible period, the sensor at the extreme to which the gate
was to be propelled has not changed state. In order to avoid burning out the
motor by pushing the gate against a physical limit, it is not difficult to add a
requirement that the motor should never be run for more than, say, a minute. If
one is lucky enough to have a free hand in ordering further sensors, one might
track extra phenomena; even if not, a developer might well suggest a warning
signal be added to record when normal operation ceases.
This train of thought is what gives plausibility to the statement that han-
dling exceptions just needs weaker assumptions and different (in some sense also
weaker) guarantees. But there is a difficult question about handling the handover
between normal and exceptional behaviour. If one wants a single specification of
the entire system, it is very easy to be inadvertently prescriptive about exactly
when the deviation from normal behaviour must be sensed. This key problem is
addressed in Section 4 as describing “phase changes”.
Michael’s relatively small challenge problem offers another sort of exception
that has taxed the basic HJJ approach. The other side of the coin on delayed
sensor indication is a premature signal. Indeed, what if sensors indicating that
the gate is in two different positions are on “together”. Clearly, something is
amiss. It is tempting to say that a safe system must detect such abnormalities
(and again turn on an alarm). But here again, stating the precise timing can re-
sult in unrealisable specifications. For example, if the eventual program is to poll
two sensors, it cannot possibly detect that the two sensors are on at precisely the
same time because the polling events will be separated by an –admittedly very
small– interval. In fact, two such positive sequential sensor readings (separated
perhaps by a thread interruption) do not constitute proof that the sensors were
on unacceptably close together in time. Of course, in the example of the sluice
gate, with presumably a dedicated processor, these issues could probably be ig-
nored. But they would be ignored at risk to life and limb if one were designing
an in-flight monitor or a reactor protection system.
There should clearly be a general way to record and reason about the kind
of transient issues that have been illustrated here with short-circuit or flickering
sensors. In [JHJ07] we made some progress on this issue with a form of “Deon-
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tic implication” stating that (a) if errors persist for a long period of time, the
system must shut down; and (b) that the system is allowed to shut down only
if there was at least a (short) period of time when evidence for erroneous be-
haviour could be observed. In that paper we also looked at other ways of making
system descriptions more robust by minimising assumptions and considering the
gathering of evidence that a system is getting closer to violating its assumptions.
These topics are looked at again in Section 4 but with only indications of
how we hope to achieve a perspicuous combination of idealised and exceptional
behaviour.
Stochastic
Many of the fault-tolerance issues are in fact likely to be expressed in terms
of probabilistic (e.g. mean time to failure) terms. For example, the overall re-
quirement of a highly reliable sluice gate might state how often the customer is
prepared to accept a failure; an implementation might need “triple modular re-
dundancy” on the sensors to achieve the requirement. Clearly, this is more likely
to be a significant issue towards the air traffic control end of the complexity
spectrum. There, it is likely to be the case that one has to make stochastic as-
sumptions about the behaviour of human players in a system. Interestingly, the
role of humans also becomes important in thinking about the dependability of
systems that use encryption for security (e.g. the trade-off between longer pass-
words being more secure and the ability of humans to remember them without
recording them in ways that increase overall system vulnerability).
The only observation that is made in this paper is that it looks plausible
to extend rely/guarantee thinking to stochastic statements — but there is no
corresponding item in Section 4 that takes this point forward.
Making HJJ into a method
The reader might have noted that HJJ has been referred to as an “approach”.
There have been erudite discussions between Michael and my colleague at New-
castle, Manuel Mazzara, as to what constitutes a “method”. (In fact, these dis-
cussions gave me the Latin quotation from Descartes.)
What we can say so far is that an outline of an HJJ method might include:
1. choose the system’s perimeter (wider than the pure control system)
2. record (and agree with the customer) the requirements at this level
3. record (and agree with the customer) assumptions about other system com-
ponents necessary for this behaviour to be realisable
4. iterate steps 2–3 with weaker assumptions to cover exceptional behaviour
5. handle the “composition issue”5
Here again, this point is not developed in the current paper. The reader is
referred to [Maz09] for a discussion of “Layered Fault-Tolerant Systems”. It is
also worth remembering that Michael had the requirement that a method in the
sense of [Jac75] or [Jac83] should in some reasonable sense be “normative”.
5 See Section 4.
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Hasn’t this all been done before?
When undertaking research, I prefer to have a go at a problem without reading
other “possible solutions” — but there comes a point at which it is prudent to
check if someone else has solved a problem that, in this case, has held up the
HJJ authors for a number of years. We would in fact be delighted to find such
a preemption and move on to other topics.
To make clear why we feel this is not a solved problem, it is perhaps worth
reiterating some of our desiderata.6 I have long held the view that it is possible
to view the (possibly erroneous) behaviour of external components as a form of
“interference”. This dates back to some consulting work I did on an “Inherently
Safe Automatic Trip” [SW89]: briefly, ISAT was a clever nuclear reactor protec-
tion trip system that had many internal checks (and caused reactor shut-down
if these failed) but there was no proof of resilience against a stated set of excep-
tions. We showed that the assumptions could be captured by rely conditions.
One thing that inhibited wider publication at that time was the fact that the
assumptions tended to be at a different level of abstraction than the system
functionality.
It is a distinctive feature of the HJJ approach that it is not intended that a
model is built of the external system components; the aim is to make minimal
assumptions.
It is also important to note that the HJJ approach does not construct a
state in which both physical phenomena and their approximation are stored
together. This feels like the same sort of confusion that dogged programming
language descriptions that used “grand state” operational semantic descriptions.
The HJJ approach records assumptions about the relationship between things
beyond the machine and their internal representations (approximations). In so
doing, it makes immediately clear that the machine cannot (directly) affect the
values in the physical world. It is interesting to link this thought with the writings
of another wise author: [Ken78] makes the clear distinction between “Data and
Reality”.
4 Where next
The frank list of open issues in Section 3 might appear off-putting. In this sec-
tion, we indicate where we are looking for progress. Hayes and Jones want a
way of recording the overall system specification. Furthermore, this should not
consist of a massive conjunction of implications.7 In contrast, Michael Jackson
is, in cases of “normal design”, prepared to leave some of the overall system
properties to known engineering. (More recently, Michael has also drawn inspi-
ration from Polanyi’s writings about “operational principles”.) This is not to say
6 For some more detailed comparisons with other approaches, see [JHJ07, Section 4.1].
7 Inspiration here might be taken from the err clauses in VDM [Jon90]. In fact, this
is rather close to the otherwise operator with which we experimented in [HJJ03].
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that Michael would reject an overall system description but he is perhaps less
concerned about it than his two co-authors.
In any case, it is clear that a key to perspicuous (“layered”) specifications
of fault-tolerant systems is the ability to handle “phase change” conveniently.
The notion of “phases” has other applications. It is for instance possible to
consider the important “initialisation concern” via phases; it is also possible to
consider the broader lifetime of a system including commissioning, revision and
decommissioning from the point of view of phases.
These considerations have led us to look at the “Time Bands” concept de-
scribed in [BH09]. In outline, like most good ideas, what underlies time bands is
rather simple: it is often easier to understand (and/or describe) a system at dif-
ferent granularities of time. What is most easily viewed as an atomic “event” at
a coarse granularity might be broken down at a finer granularity. Central to the
time band model of [BH09] is the idea that there is a “precision” associated with
each time band: when one says –at say the hour band– that a meeting starts at
11.00, there is no expectation this has to happen to the second. One intriguing
match between time band concerns and the handling of exceptional behaviour
is the way in which exceptions are often distinguished by crossing time bands.
The model developed in [BH09] is to my eyes more complicated than is
needed to resolve the open issues in HJJ.8 In fact, just the inclusion of a notion
like (time) precision might resolve the phase change issue.
Anther intriguing avenue is the teleo-reactive notation of Nilson [Nil94] as
developed by Keith Clark. Ian Hayes [Hay08] has observed that the way in which
outer guards are evaluated as the state evolves models closely the way in which
exceptions cause interruption of “durative” actions. (Ian has also observed that
in some sense this just shifts the semantic problem; but at least the difficulty is
concentrated in one place.)
Acknowledgements
Anyone who has cooperated with Michael Jackson knows how stimulating it can
be: the untiring series of challenges and the joy in discussing them (always with
supreme politeness) makes him one of the most productive collaborators I know.
Since this paper is written (unusually for me) in the first person singular, I
should also like to record my thanks to the other person in HJJ: Ian Hayes is
ever patient and thorough — also a joy as a collaborator.
My research is currently funded by the EU “Deploy” project, the (UK) EP-
SRC “TrAmS” project and the ARC project (that brings together Ian Hayes,
Keith Clark, Alan Burns and myself) “Time Bands for Teleo-Reactive Pro-
grams”.
8 We have discussed questions like “timeless time bands” and using the “fuzziness”
notion on all measures not just time.
From Problem Frames to HJJ: known unknowns 11
References
[BH09] Alan Burns and Ian Hayes. A timeband framework for modelling real-time
systems. submitted to Real-Time Systems, 2009.
[CH04] Zhou Chaochen and Michael R. Hansen. Duration Calculus. Springer, 2004.
[CHR91] Zhou Chaochen, C.A.R. Hoare, and A.P. Ravn. A calculus of durations.
Information Processing Letters, 40:269–271, December 1991.
[CJ00] Pierre Collette and Cliff B. Jones. Enhancing the tractability of
rely/guarantee specifications in the development of interfering operations. In
Gordon Plotkin, Colin Stirling, and Mads Tofte, editors, Proof, Language and
Interaction, chapter 10, pages 277–307. MIT Press, 2000.
[CJ07] J. W. Coleman and C. B. Jones. A structural proof of the soundness of
rely/guarantee rules. Journal of Logic and Computation, 17(4):807–841, 2007.
[Hay08] Ian J. Hayes. Towards reasoning about teleo-reactive programs for robust
real-time systems. In SERENE ’08: Proceedings of the 2008 RISE/EFTS
Joint International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems,
pages 87–94, November 2008.
[HJJ03] Ian Hayes, Michael Jackson, and Cliff Jones. Determining the specification
of a control system from that of its environment. In Keijiro Araki, Stefani
Gnesi, and Dino Mandrioli, editors, FME 2003: Formal Methods, volume 2805
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 154–169. Springer Verlag, 2003.
[Jac75] Michael Jackson. Principles of Program Design. Academic Press, 1975.
[Jac83] Michael Jackson. System Design. Prentice-Hall International, 1983.
[Jac00] Michael Jackson. Problem Frames: Analyzing and structuring software devel-
opment problems. Addison-Wesley, 2000.
[Jac03] Michael Jackson. Aspects of system description. In Annabelle McIver and
Carroll Morgan, editors, Programming Methodology, pages 137–160. Springer
Verlag, 2003.
[JHJ07] Cliff B. Jones, Ian J. Hayes, and Michael A. Jackson. Deriving specifications
for systems that are connected to the physical world. In Cliff B. Jones, Zhim-
ing Liu, and Jim Woodcock, editors, Formal Methods and Hybrid Real-Time
Systems: Essays in Honour of Dines Bjørner and Zhou Chaochen on the Oc-
casion of Their 70th Birthdays, volume 4700 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 364–390. Springer Verlag, 2007.
[Jon81] C. B. Jones. Development Methods for Computer Programs including a No-
tion of Interference. PhD thesis, Oxford University, June 1981. Printed as:
Programming Research Group, Technical Monograph 25.
[Jon83a] C. B. Jones. Specification and design of (parallel) programs. In Proceedings
of IFIP’83, pages 321–332. North-Holland, 1983.
[Jon83b] C. B. Jones. Tentative steps toward a development method for interfering
programs. Transactions on Programming Languages and System, 5(4):596–
619, 1983.
[Jon90] C. B. Jones. Systematic Software Development using VDM. Prentice Hall
International, second edition, 1990.
[Jon96] C. B. Jones. Accommodating interference in the formal design of concur-
rent object-based programs. Formal Methods in System Design, 8(2):105–122,
March 1996.
[JP08] Cliff B. Jones and Ken G. Pierce. Splitting atoms with rely/guarantee condi-
tions coupled with data reification. In ABZ2008, volume LNCS 5238, pages
360–377, 2008.
12 Cliff B. Jones
[Ken78] William Kent. Data and Reality. North Holland, 1978.
[Maz09] Manuel Mazzara. Deriving specifications of dependable systems: toward a
method. In Proceedings of the 12th European Workshop on Dependable Com-
puting (EWDC 2009), 2009.
[MH91] B. Mahony and I. Hayes. Using continuous real functions to model timed
histories. In P. Bailes, editor, Engineering Safe Software, pages 257–270.
Australian Computer Society, 1991.
[MH92] B. P. Mahony and I. J. Hayes. A case-study in timed refinement: A mine
pump. IEEE Trans. on Software Engineering, 18(9):817–826, 1992.
[Nil94] N. Nilsson. Teleo-reactive programs for agent control. Journal of Artificial
Intelligence Research, 1:139–158, 1994.
[SW89] I. C. Smith and D. N. Wall. Programmable electronic systems for reactor
safety. Atom, (395), 1989.
